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Words are powerful - Thoughts shape - Ideas have consequences

Lawrence Roberge

Author, Bioethicist, Biomedical Researcher
Posted March 28, 2005

Cloning: Scientific, Technological, and Ethical Considerations
Part IV

10. THE BIOETHICS OF HUMAN CLONING

A. ARGUMENTS FOR HUMAN CLONING

Advocates for human cloning do exist. In June 1997, at a conference entitled Mammalian Cloning: Implications for Science and Society, a straw poll of the scientists attending, was taken at the beginning and ending of the conference. At the beginning, no one saw any reason for human cloning and felt it must be prohibited. By the end of the conference, the scientists minds were influenced by the presentations in such a way that many came to believe that human cloning via nuclear transfer for the purpose of avoiding mitochondrial disease might be acceptable (42).

Furthermore, in an article published in the New England Journal of Medicine, researchers stated that a ban imposed by Congress would be a mistake (43, 57). The authors, Kasirer and Rosenthal (57), state the human cloning may help provide replacement tissues. But, the tissue need not be obtained from a fully development human being but rather from a supply of stem cells, perhaps of embryonic origin. Also, further experiments using cloned human embryos may help illuminate the mechanisms of aging and causes of cancer (43, 57). Finally, the authors contend that the Bond-Frist Bill in the United States Senate (58) and the Ehlers bill (59) in the United States House are too extreme. These bills would even block such biotechnological techniques as cloning molecules, cells, and tissues. The authors prefer more lenient legislative approaches and desire a voluntary oversight using the FDA (57).

Another supporter of human cloning, Dr. John Robertson of the University of Texas School of Law has advocated the right of persons to clone themselves (60, 61). Dr. Robertson advances four main arguments for human cloning (61): 1) to reduce anonymity of donors (as compared with the anonymity of donor eggs, sperm, or adoption) for infertile couples trying to have children; 2) to reduce the risk of spreading genetic diseases to offspring; 3) creating organ or tissue sources for donation; and 4) enabling a couple to clone a dead or dying child and therefore have that child live on in some closely related form. Dr. Robertson also notes that a couple should be free to chose cloning unless there are compelling reasons for thinking that cloning would create harm that other procedures would not cause (61). Dr. Robertson ignores the fact that the compelling reason not to clone would be that the clone may experience harm in a process that could render it lost via miscarriage, stillbirth, or born seriously deformed (see the section on Deformity Issues below).

In an accompanying article, Dr. George Annas (62) of Boston University Schools of Medicine and Public Health clarifies objections to human cloning by including a point that Dr. Robertson ignores in his compelling reason not to clone-lost of liberty of the individual. The process of cloning reduces the individual to a mere carbon copy of the original. The societal and psychological responses to the clone may result in limits to liberty and free choices as the resulting child is raised in a world that has prejudged (and perhaps labeled) the child not as an individual, but as a copy of the donor. Columnist Ellen Goodman (63) in her recent comments about Dr. Richard Seed's announcement to clone himself further supported this view. Goodman notes that the clone would be regarded more as a copy of the donor, Dr. Seed, than as an individual.

One succinct analysis for reasons to have human cloning comes from the philosophy professor, Philip Kitcher (41). Briefly, Kitcher states that three reasons for human cloning are: to provide a source of transplant tissues, to provide offspring for infertile couples or to a widow or widower who loses a spouse or child, and to provide children for lesbian and gay couples.

The first case, creating a clone of a human being for spare body parts has several attractive reasons: since the nuclear donor can be the tissue recipient, immunocompatibility is 100% and thus immunorejection risk would be nil. The means to provide the cells or whole organs may not require the clone to attain even birth, since tissue transplant research has already used human fetal and embryonic cells for therapeutic purposes. Nevertheless, the moral and ethical repugnancy must be clearly stated. In essence, one would create a life to use as a spare parts supplier. It is conceivable in this manner that researchers would create a life, sacrifice a life, for the latter purpose of saving a life. This attempt at proportionalism, attempting to get some "good" out of an "evil" event, is clearly contrary to Church teaching.

The second case of providing infertile couples with children strikes at the emotional heartstrings of many in American society. Yet the seductive siren of getting something at ANY costs is destructive at best and terrifying at worst. Later in the text, further problems regarding human cloning will be discussed, but for now one question can be raised: are these children wanted at any cost going to be loved and appreciated EVEN if they are not perfect? Remember: in the creation of Dolly, the Wilmut group succeeded after 276 tries. What happens to the child born that is defective genetically or born severally deformed? Will they be loved and cared for as any "natural born" child? Or will they be discarded so the researchers can try again to achieve the birth of a perfect clone?

Finally, Kitcher strikes on a controversial topic: homosexuality. Do homosexuals have the right to children? Many states allow homosexuals to raise children from a prior marriage or adopt. How would society react to cloned children from a lesbian couple? Kitcher states that one female could donate the oocyte and one could donate the nucleus, and finally, a surrogate mother could be obtained, if neither female from the lesbian couple wants to carry the child to term. Many questions arise which will be explored shortly in this paper. But it must be noted that Kitcher lists this last reason as the purest and most defensible reasoning for human cloning. Kitcher states that this reasoning does not impose a plan for the new life. Rather, the desire to have a child is just an expression of the couple's mutual love. Yet,

the nature of the creation of the child is by definition "unnatural" and it raises questions (similar to the infertile couple issue) as to the length at which this "love" would go to obtain a child (41).

B. MITOCHONDRIAL ISSUES

One question regarding cloning research-either human or animal-that has not been resolved is the role of the mitochondria (12). As previously mentioned, animal cells have most of their DNA packed in an organelle called the nucleus. Yet, a small loop of DNA resides in the mitochondria, which is the cell organelle that acts as the powerhouse of the cell. Although only some of the genes for mitochondrial proteins exist in the mitochondria DNA (others are coded in the nuclear DNA), the integrity of the mitochondrial DNA is essential for proper mitochondrial function. The primary function of the mitochondria is the creation of Adenosine Tri-Phosphate (ATP) which acts as the energy currency for the cell.

The source for all animal mitochondria (and the mitochondrial DNA) is maternal, that is from the oocyte. Thus, in the creation of a clone via nuclear transfer techniques, the source of mitochondrial DNA is NOT from the donor, but rather from the oocyte source. This raises important questions, as it is now known that gene defects to the mitochondria DNA can lead to various diseases (12). As such, any oocyte (especially those used for later human cloning techniques) must be screened for mitochondrial based diseases. This is very important since even if the genetic health of the nuclear donor is known, the presence of mitochondrial gene defects could be passed to the clone via the recipient oocyte.

Also, there exist differences between various species with regards to mitochondria DNA sequences. Since very little research exists on the effects of the mitochondria on cloned embryo development, it is not know if these differences will play a role in interfering in the function of interspecies clones created by donor nucleus of one species and the oocyte (containing mitochondria!) of another species. This aspect will be an important consideration for such research to clone panda bears by Dr. Chen Da-Yuan or the interspecies cloning work by Dr. Neal First (24, 44, and 45).

Although Dr. First studies have not yielded to date a live birth clone, the possibility exists that future interspecies cloned animals could be identified from their oocyte donors based on mitochondrial genetic tests. Furthermore, since difference species may have unique sequences within the mitochondrial DNA, it may be possible to determine which oocyte source a particular clone had (i.e. cow, horse, pig, etc.). It must also be noted that if the cloned animals and wild type animals crossbred in nature (example: panda bears), this might lead to mixed genotypes with variations between cloned genotypes, wild genotypes and variations in between. Normally, since mitochondria of one type or another eventually become dominant in the cell line (12), very little research exists on the effects of mixed mitochondria on development of the organisms. Therefore, it is unknown whether interspecies organisms will create ecological problems of their own, such as competition for survival of the wild type species versus survival of the chimeric cloned species.

One final thought regarding mitochondrial DNA and application of interspecies oocyte sources involves the definition of the term "clone". If a clone is by definition a genetically identical duplicate of the donor, then would a clone created using interspecies oocyte methods in fact create an "imperfect clone" since the mitochondrial genome of the donor and the clone would be different? More accurately, these interspecies clones could be genetic "chimeras", having genetically (but perhaps not phenotypically) traits from two different species.

Could this difference lead to discrimination in the future? Would the clones be considered a new species-a type of chimera-part cow part pig? What if use of cow oocytes, which are cheap, plentiful, and relatively easy to handle, were used for human cloning experiments? If the oocyte cytoplasm does act to reprogram the nucleus as suggested by Hart et al (26) and Campbell (11), then cow oocytes might provide a cheap source of oocytes to accelerate human cloning experiments. If they were used, would this affect the human clone's physiology? Would society react differently to a human with a partial cow "mother" than to a clone with a human oocyte source? These are questions that may need to be answered well before such experiments progress.

C. DEFORMITY ISSUES

Another human cloning issue that needs to be examined is the problem of deformities. As previously discussed, the present cloning techniques yield a very low success rate of live births, nuclear transfer for sheep (1 out of 277, less than 1%), whereas nuclear transfer for mice (2.8%)(8, 10). Some of the failures were lost due to spontaneous abortion (miscarriage), stillbirths, and birth defects. The questions that now arise include: What does one do with a deformed birth? How do the researchers, parents, and others deal with "failures"? Would there be any need to grieve the losses? Would they be considered human lives (and human deaths), if they have not been born? What would the public relations reactions be to announcements of deformed cloned babies? If the cloning technology becomes a business, as Dr. Seed is striving for, then would corporate public relations necessitate silent disposal of or at least covert burial of the dead? Also, would deformed clones be hidden from public view and the view of corporate investors? If Dr. Seed's view is giving any indication, the deformed lives and dead fetuses will be viewed as merely information to build upon the science of cloning (32). Also, it must be noted that the embryo splitting cloning work done by Dr. Stillman and Dr. Hall was performed with the knowledge that the end result-the cloned embryos-were to be disposed of with no regard for their potential humanity (1, 4). The reasoning that the embryos were defective does not negate their human origins or the reality of their identity as human persons (1, 4, 28).

Thus, cloned lives, from embryos to live births, would become merely data points for an experiment. In this author's view, the dignity of humanity again slides down another notch.

D. LICENSING OF CLONES

The issue of licensing of clones has become a topic of great science fiction speculation, but the reality is far from speculation. The question arises that if the clones are part human and part animal (such as using interspecies nuclear transfer cloning) would the laws for patenting of transgenic animals come into play? If so, would the clones therefore be considered property? How does one rationalize the difference between a clone and a natural born person? If clones become expendable, as demonstrated by the Stillman and Hall research (1, 4, 28), would then full grown clones eventually experience the same erosion of rights and dignity?

Although this concept may seem difficult to comprehend, several precedents for property labeling of human embryos already exist. At the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center in New York City, infertile couples can pay this infertility clinic up to $2750 for pre-made embryos of select ancestry (64, 65). These "adoptions" come from custom-made embryos made by doctors who combine the eggs and sperm according to the donors looks, education, and ethnicity (64). The problem is that this form of "baby selling", although technically illegal under the anti-slavery inspired 13th Amendment to the United States Constitution, is allowed if it is considered adoption. As mentioned earlier, even with good genes, without proper nurture, is not a guarantee of a quality person whether the embryo is eugenically selected or not.

Another example of labeling a living person as property is the case of Richard Gladu of Wayland, MA (66). Gladu's former wife impregnated herself with a frozen embryo fertilized with his sperm at the Boston IVF clinic several years earlier. Gladu and his estranged wife previously attended the Boston IVF clinic in an attempt to conceive children. The resulting excess three embryos were stored after the birth of two boys at Boston IVF. After the divorce, Gladu's wife re-impregnated herself with an embryo resulting in the birth of a daughter. Gladu is suing Boston IVF and the doctor for a wrongful birth action. Gladu's attorney stated that Gladu feels the embryo was his "property" and that it was stolen from him (66).

Another question arises from the possibility of licensing our DNA. If one could license their DNA, just as an entertainer licenses their name or trademark, could it not be possible to license any product from that DNA? If so, could clones made from someone's DNA be capable of licensing or at least undergoing some sort of proprietary control? Granted this must rely on the laws to allow humans to license or patent their tissues or DNA, yet if this occurred, would clones be far behind? Part of the answer to the last question may derive from how society looks upon cloned human beings.

© Lawrence Roberge 2005 Reprinted with Permission

LAWRENCE F. ROBERGE M.S.is a biotechnology consultant, college instructor, bioethicist, and biomedical researcher. He is the author of the new book, THE COST OF ABORTION (Four Winds Publications, LaGrange, GA, 1995). He has consulted for pharmaceutical, medical, and biotechnology corporations across the United States, Canada, and Europe. He has published research on neuroscience, biomedicine, abortion vaccine technology, and the adverse effects of abortion on women.

Contact: Lroberge@map.com Website: www.lawrenceroberge.com